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Grouping of Misconduct Types in 
Case of VAT Fraud
SZABÓ Barna1
The formation of the tax system is as old as the emergence of statehood,  
together with the intention of not paying taxes. The value added tax, i.e. VAT, 
is no difference. The European Communities decided to introduce VAT during 
the tax harmonisation process in 1973. The liberalised free flow of production 
factors between Member States has provided an opportunity for the increas-
ingly complicated and complex methods of VAT fraud. The main objective of 
my study is to present a possible grouping of VAT frauds according to my own 
conceptual approach.
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Introduction
The idea of value added tax (hereinafter: VAT) originates from the French tax adminis-
tration employee, Maurice Lauré. It has been levied since 10 April 1954, starting with 
only the largest companies, gradually extending to all sectors of the economy.2 In an 
effort of harmonisation of law, it was implemented in 1973 in the member states of 
the European Union (or rather European Communities, its predecessor at the time).3 
Being eager to adopt the taxation principles of European countries, Hungary followed 
suit in 1988.4
Initial fraudulent attempts to evade VAT were quite simple. However, during the de-
velopment of the integration of the European Union – after the accession in 2004, with 
Hungary on board and as an integral part – production factors, i.e. the free movement 
of products, services, capital and workforce gave rise to the emergence of more complex 
and sophisticated VAT evasion attempts.
The significance of combating VAT evasion is demonstrated by the fact that VAT, i.e. 
the direct tax on consumption forms one of the most important sources of income in 
most tax systems. (It is necessary to note that for example, in 2017, the VAT income 
of the Hungarian budget was HUF 3.525 billion, amounting to one fourth of the entire 
1 SZABÓ Barna, Major, Financial Investigator, National Tax and Customs Administration of Hungary, Criminal Affairs 
Directorate, General Central Investigation Division.
 ORCID: 0000-0002-1040-5656, szabo.barna@nav.gov.hu
2 Salo (2014) 130–131.
3 Magyar-Áhel (2012) 85.
4 Magyar-Áhel (2014) 10.
6.
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budget.) Additionally, the establishment of the percentage of VAT can also have a crimi-
nal law relevance, namely that high VAT content may increase the rate of grey economy, 
as economic actors – especially small and medium size businesses with relatively scarce 
financial resources – show increased willingness to forgo an invoice, thus evade VAT.5
In this paper – keeping the significance of combating VAT evasion in mind – I am 
attempting to separate VAT-related budget fraud (which is a crime) from VAT evasion 
(which constitutes a fraudulent conduct), and to present types of VAT evasion attempts 
published by other authors in the professional discourse. Of course, to understand VAT 
evasion schemes, it is necessary to take a closer look at the main characteristics of the 
working mechanism of VAT relevant from criminal law aspects.
However, an additional, but significant objective of this study is to create a classi-
fication system of budget fraud schemes regarding VAT along classification principles 
pointing out the criminal aspects of each scheme, based on the Act on Criminal Procedure.
Differentiating the Criminal Act of Budget Fraud from VAT 
Evasion and the Fraudulent Conduct of VAT Evasion
Considering that the objective of this writing is the classification of the attempts of 
budget fraud regarding VAT, first I need to differentiate budget fraud, as a criminal act 
that needs to be dealt with by the law enforcement authorities from a mere fraudulent 
conduct affecting VAT, which falls within the scope of the tax administration.
In order to proceed with the above, one has to be familiar with the legal principle of 
nullum crimen sine lege, in other words, no crime without law. This means that acts not 
declared by law as criminal acts are in fact not crimes. This applies to VAT evasions, too.
Point a) of subsection (1) of section 396 of the currently effective Hungarian penal 
code, i.e. Act C of 2012 on the Criminal Code is the provision to declare VAT eva-
sion – amongst other unlawful acts causing financial harm to the budget – a criminal act 
of budget fraud. However, based on subsection (3) of section 462 of the above statute, 
budget fraud by VAT evasion is only a crime, if the financial harm caused by the fraud 
exceeds a hundred thousand forints. Budget fraud by VAT evasion, as a criminal act may 
be penalised within the framework of a criminal procedure by two to up to ten years of 
imprisonment, depending on the value of the evasion (i.e. the financial loss suffered by 
the budget) and the criminal conspiracy, or commercial characteristic of the fraud.
However, regarding the penalty of budget fraud by VAT evasion, I have to emphasise 
the currently prevailing notion that efficiency of combating economic crime cannot be 
increased by the years of imprisonment imposed. It can only be achieved by decreasing 
the lucrativeness and profitability of this profit-oriented crime, i.e. by decreasing the 
possible proceeds of such criminal acts.6
5 Ercsey (2016) 170, 176.
6 Tóth (2015) 20.
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If the financial loss suffered by the budget’s VAT income does not exceed a hundred 
thousand forints or the elements of statutory definition are not fully satisfied, no VAT 
evasion is committed in the sense of criminal act. However, based on Act CL of 2017 
on the Rules of Taxation, omission of tax payment can still be established in a tax ad-
ministrative proceeding and sanctioned by a tax fine. Furthermore, tax administrative 
proceedings run parallel to a criminal procedure, one does not preclude the other.
Classification of Schemes of Budget Fraud by VAT Evasion
Balázs Gábor Fodor, PhD, student at the Faculty of Law of the Károli Gáspár University 
of the Reformed Church started his presentation at the conference entitled Criminal 
Law Enforcement of the Budget with quoting from Benjamin Franklin: “…in this world 
nothing can be said to be certain, except death and taxes.” Then he went on with Gábor 
Tolnai’s words: “The third is that people will make significant efforts to avoid the first 
two.” If we immerse in studying the schemes of budget fraud by VAT evasion, we will 
quite soon agree with Gábor Tolnai and find that people come up with quite creative 
and complex constructions to avoid taxes.
The above quotes vividly demonstrate that due to their diversity, schemes of budget 
fraud by VAT evasion are also difficult to categorise. Each author does it his/her own 
way, along different categorisation criteria.
In this writing, I have highlighted three criteria I deemed to have criminal law as-
pects, namely: the working mechanism of VAT, the invoicing chains between the sub-
ject companies and the elements of statutory definition. The aspects I followed when 
choosing these criteria will be elaborated on in the chapter Objectives and Methodology 
of Classification. Below, I will present the schemes more or less matching the selected 
criteria, using the available professional discourse as a source.
However, to understand individual schemes, it is necessary to clarify the term VAT 
and a few relevant characteristics of its working mechanism (Figure 1). VAT is a several- 
phase net sales tax that is levied on businesses in every phase of manufacture and 
distribution, and the ultimate burden is borne by the end user, i.e. the consumer. Con-
sequently, VAT is paid in every manufacturing and distribution phase and by every 
business.7 However, to avoid multiple taxation, businesses in each phase may deduct 
taxes already paid whe-n purchasing the goods from the taxes payable upon sales. If 
this yields a positive value, they incur tax payment obligations, while if negative, they 
establish rights to a tax refund. Consequently, the burden of taxes is borne by consum-
ers at the end of the supply chain, who buy the products or avail the services.
For cross-border manufacture or distribution phases, businesses’ tax obligations 
and tax deduction rights are different. Act CXXVII of 2007 on Value Added Tax (here-
inafter: VAT Act) distinguishes import of goods (when goods are imported to the ter-
ritory of the European Community from a  so called third country), from purchases 
7 Faluvégi–Kállai (1987) 136.
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from within the Community (when goods are imported from the member states of the 
European Community). The opposite of import is called export of goods or sales of goods 
within the Community. It is an important fact that for the purposes of the VAT Act, the 
European Community includes the member states of the European Union and all coun-
tries with the same legal status in terms of tax harmonisation.
For import of goods and for purchases from within the Community, the same tax 
rates are levied on products and services as on the goods with domestic origin. However, 
if statutory conditions exist, buyers may have the taxes levied on their purchases from 
within the Community deducted just like in case of domestic purchases. Export of 
goods and sales within the community is not subject to VAT, but VAT already paid 
after such transactions may be deducted.8 According to VAT Act, if imported goods are 
brought into the country for resale to another member state without taxes, i.e. with 
a so called tax free import of goods via an intra-Community transfer of goods, within 
the framework of the custom procedure encoded 42.00, importers are exempted from 
tax obligations, as VAT will be paid in the destination country.
At the above conference, Balázs Gábor Fodor also based his classification of VAT 
fraud schemes basically on the working mechanism of VAT, and has distinguished the 
following groups:
1. Wilful omission of tax returns: In this scheme, taxpayers hide their non-taxed 
transactions by a full or partial omission of tax returns towards the tax admin-
istration.
2. Wilful acceptance of fictitious invoices: Acceptance of invoices without an under-
lying transaction or invoices with false contents (for example, the invoice was 
issued by a person other than the originator indicated on the invoice) to wilful-
ly evade taxes or to apply for a tax refund.
3. Misrepresented tax exemption: After a domestic gross purchase, perpetrators mis-
represent tax-free sales within the Community, then have the VAT refunded. 
Subsequently, they fake having purchased the goods from another member state, 
and wilfully omit payment of VAT levied on their sales. This scheme is also called 
a carousel fraud.
4. Hiding acquisitions from member states: Acquisitions from the community where 
tax is levied are hidden by perpetrators, who sell the purchased goods unlaw-
fully, without taxes later.9
8 Sztanó (2012) 141–142.
9 Fodor (2007) 92–94.
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Taxpayer Seller Buyer 
Deductible VAT VAT levied on 
sales 
 
If: 
 VAT levied on sales – Deductible VAT > 0 → Tax payment obligation 
VAT levied on sales – Deductible VAT < 0 → Right to tax refund 
 
Seller 
Domestic Third country, 
Other member 
states 
Taxpayer Buyer 
VAT levied on 
sales 
  
VAT levied on intra-
Community purchases or 
import of goods 
If the statutory conditions exist, VAT levied on intra-Community purchases or import of goods 
is deductible. 
  
Seller Buyer 
Deductible VAT 
VAT-exempt export of goods 
and/or intra-Community sales 
Taxpayer Buyer Seller 
VAT-exempt import of goods  
VAT-exempt intra-
Community sales 
The transaction takes place within the framework of a customs procedure encoded 42.00, with 
tax-exempt import of goods via intra-EU transfer of goods. 
  
Taxpayer 
Third country, 
Other member 
states 
A right to tax refund is established. 
  
Figure 1. VAT obligations for domestic- and cross-border transactions
Source: Compiled by the author based on the VAT Act.
Borbála Sólyom, in her PhD thesis entitled Combating Tax Fraud and Tax Evasion in the 
European Union, with Special Regards to the Jurisprudence of the European Court, focused 
on the invoicing chains between the companies she examined, and, based on the re-
sults, she has distinguished:10
1. normal, general tax fraud, existing in domestic trade
2. normal, general cross-border tax fraud, and
3. fraud schemes involving missing traders
10 Sólyom (2015) 64–84.
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Regarding normal and general schemes in the first two groups, the author lists a few 
examples, with the main common characteristic of a simple and less organised invoicing 
chain created by the perpetrators, regardless of the transaction’s domestic or cross-bor-
der nature. In normal, general tax frauds, perpetrators falsify invoices to only one in-
voice down the invoicing chain (input, output or both). In these doctored invoices, 
they increase the deductible or decrease the payable VAT content of real or fictitious 
transactions with real or fictitious business partners. In other cases, they do not even 
bother filing their VAT returns, causing financial losses to the budget.
Unlike normal, general tax fraud cases, the objective of missing trader schemes is 
the misuse of opportunities opened up by cross-border trade.
In Chapter 4 of the textbook entitled EU and the Specializations of Controlling, Eszter 
Magyar-Áhel explores these organised missing trader VAT fraud schemes, including or-
ganised EU cross-border VAT frauds, reflecting on the VAT evasion schemes published 
and classified by the experts of the European Commission.11
1. Carousel fraud (Figure 2): In this scheme, the first element of the domestic in-
voicing chain is a so called Missing Trader, who in fact is not engaged in any 
economic activities whatsoever. This player accepts invoices from companies 
incorporated in another member state (Conduit), which is invoiced further to 
the last element of the domestic invoicing chain (characteristically through 
other (Buffer) companies to make the invoicing chain more complex). This last 
element of the invoicing chain is the beneficiary of the chain. This element is 
also called Broker. Subsequently, the Broker issues an invoice to the Conduit, 
which is a company incorporated in a different member state. When the Miss-
ing Trader accepts the Conduit’s invoice, the invoicing chain is closed. Missing 
Traders do not remit the VAT levied on sales to the budget. Characteristically, 
they do not even file such VAT returns, and authorities will not be able to reach 
them. The last elements of the domestic invoicing chain will claim tax deduc-
tions on invoices accepted directly or indirectly from Missing Traders, causing 
financial losses to the budget.
The most important characteristic of carousel fraud is that such invoicing circles do 
not necessarily reflect real economic transactions, the system is viable without market 
demand and actual sales, practically in laboratory circumstances, with the use of fic-
titious invoices only. If this fraudulent invoicing chain does not catch the authorities’ 
attention, the only limit to the financial losses suffered by the budget is the perpetra-
tors’ mercy.
11 Magyar-Áhel (2012) 85–99.
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Missing Trader 
Other member 
states 
Buffer 
Broker 
Conduit 
Domestic 
Figure 2. Carousel fraud
Source: Compiled by the author based on Magyar-Áhel (2012) 86.
2. Another type of fraud is committed by involving an extra missing trader, in 
other words Missing Trader Intra-Community Fraud (MTIC) scheme (Figure 3), 
wherein a seller invoices the goods as intra-Community tax free sales of goods 
to a  Missing Trader not engaged in any real economic activity whatsoever. 
The Missing Trader invoices the purchased product further, whether directly 
or through other companies to the buyer, who claims deduction of the VAT 
content of the invoice accepted from the Missing Trader, thus decreasing its 
payable VAT, even getting in the position to claim refunds. MTIC fraud can be 
realised by fictitious domestic purchases and/or hidden domestic sales.
 
Missing Trader 
Other member states 
Seller 
Buyer 
Domestic 
Figure 3. Missing Trader Fraud
Source: Compiled by the author based on Magyar-Áhel (2012) 91.
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3. Misuse of customs procedure code 42.00: In the so called customs procedure code 
42.00, i.e. tax free import of goods with intra-Community transfer of goods, 
goods imported to the territory of the European Community from third coun-
tries are subjected to a customs procedure, however, this does not entail pay-
ment of VAT levied on imported goods. The statutory condition of VAT exemp-
tion regarding imported goods is that such goods are transported further to 
another member state of the European Union, where the importer will fulfil 
this VAT payment obligation. Considering that this system is not closed, it in-
herently offers opportunities for fraud. For example, goods can be subjected 
to a customs procedure on behalf of Missing Traders in an EU member state, 
and subsequently, the real importers sell the same goods on the black market, 
without paying the VAT levied on imported goods.
4. Fictitious intra-Community or export sales: While in the above misuse of customs 
procedure code 42.00, fraudulent conduct is aimed at the VAT levied on import 
of goods, in this case, fraudulent conduct is aimed at the opposite, namely tax 
free intra-Community or export sales in a way that the domestic seller misrep-
resents VAT exempt sales to another member state or third country, but in fact, 
the recipient of the sales is a domestic entity, without an invoice.
 
Broker 
Other member states 
Fictitious seller 
Domestic 
Actual seller 
Actual buyer Fictitious buyer 
Figure 4. Cross-invoicing
Source: Compiled by the author based on Magyar-Áhel (2012) 94.
5. Cross-invoicing fraud (Figure 4): This scheme is a notch more complex than the 
previous ones. It is aimed at hiding transactions incurring VAT obligations, such 
as intra-Community purchase and domestic sales. In order to do this, perpetra-
tors attempt to offset VAT obligations incurred by intra-Community purchase 
and domestic sales by domestic purchases and tax free intra-Community sales 
establishing rights to tax deduction. Another function of fictitious intra-Com-
munity sales is to channel fictitious goods accumulating in the fraud mechanism 
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out of the system. This scheme is often part of carousel or MTIC fraud chains. 
In such cases, Missing Traders attempt to reduce their tax obligations to zero 
by such cross-invoicing.
 
Goods 
Seller  
In member state 1 
Domestic Buyer  
In member state 3 
Broker 
In member state 2 
Invoice 
Invoice 
Figure 5. Triangular trade
Source: Compiled by the author based on Magyar-Áhel (2012) 96.
6. Triangular trade fraud: First of all, I have to note that triangular trade (Figure 
5) is basically lawful. During this process, a seller incorporated in one member 
state sells goods to an intermediary incorporated in another member state, 
who then sells the goods further to a buyer incorporated in a  third member 
state. Only those goods are delivered directly by the buyer to the seller. Fraud-
ulent intentions emerge in a triangular trade, if either of the players is involved 
in a fraudulent sales chain. The purpose of this is to blur the invoicing chain, 
thus making it more difficult for authorities to unravel such crimes, as in trian-
gular trade, the invoicing chain is different from the actual routing of the goods.
Other authors base their classification of budget fraud schemes on the statutory circum-
stantial elements. It is important that schemes established this way are significantly 
more general than the ones based on the historical state of affairs. Namely, based on the 
principle of nullum crimen sine lege mentioned earlier, if not all statutory circumstantial 
elements exist, we cannot talk about the criminal act of budget fraud. However, the 
economic environment and the conditions of taxes are inherently subject to a dynamic 
change, forcing schemes to become more complex and sophisticated over time, there-
fore, to prevent loopholes and frequent amendment of regulations, it is practical to 
keep legislation as general as possible to protect the budget.
Also, for VAT evasions, schemes appear in an especially abstract way in the effective 
statutory definition. One of the possible reasons beyond the ones detailed above is that 
to enhance efficiency of protection of the budget, the legislator merged a wide array of 
criminal acts (established by separate statutory definitions earlier) causing financial 
losses to the budget, both in revenues and expenditures (including the criminal act of 
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tax fraud by evasion of VAT or other taxes) under the term of budget fraud. According-
ly, the object protectable against this criminal act is the social interests associated with 
budget revenues.12
Hungary’s effective penal code establishes the first basic case of budget fraud (which 
also includes VAT fraud) as follows:
“Any person who induces a person to hold or continue to hold a false belief, or suppresses 
known facts in connection with any budget payment obligation or with any funds paid or pay-
able from the budget, or makes a false statement to this extent and thereby causes financial 
loss to one or more budgets, is guilty of misdemeanour…”
Based on the above statutory circumstances of budget fraud, (point a) of subsection 
(1) of section 396 of Act C of 2012 on the Criminal Code), Gábor Miklós Molnár classi-
fies schemes of budget fraud as follows.13
1. Misrepresentation: Perpetrators represent false facts as true and correct, creat-
ing false impressions in the victim’s mind.
2. Condoning misrepresentation: Perpetrators fail to correct or expressly confirm 
already existing false impressions that have been present regardless of their 
conduct.
3. Making a false statement: When discussing this scheme, first of all, we need to 
clarify the definition of “statement”. A statement is not a simple representation 
of facts or beliefs. A statement contains a declaration of the person making the 
statement about his/her intentions. It always has to be recorded in writing, in 
compliance with the statutory requirements regarding its content and format. 
In this sense, a tax return is also a statement, and if false, it satisfies the statu-
tory definition of budget fraud.
4. Suppressing true facts: Suppressing true facts can only be construed against 
a specific obligation, if hiding such true facts can be linked to causing financial 
losses to the budget(s).
Taking the statutory definition in account, the above schemes committed to cause 
harm to the budget can only constitute to a criminal act, if such acts cause financial 
losses to at least one budget, and based on subsection (3) of section 462 of the above 
act, only, if this loss exceeds a hundred thousand forints.
It is important, that in consequent jurisprudences, for tax returns, including VAT 
returns, the first two schemes do not constitute to either misrepresentation, nor to 
condoning misrepresentation, because there is no passive victim. However, omission 
of payment of tax by false tax returns do constitute to a budget fraud, even if there is 
no natural person victim.
12 Molnár (2011) 281–282.
13 Molnár (2013) 717–719.
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Classification of Schemes of Budget Fraud by VAT Evasion Based 
on a Further Criteria System
In the previous chapter, we saw that due to their diversity, comprehensive classifica-
tion of VAT fraud schemes is quite problematic, while certain schemes may fit into 
more than one pre-defined groups. An example of this is a fraud mechanism by ficti-
tious intra-Community or export sales, which, under Borbála Sólyom’s classification 
criteria, falls in the category of cross-border normal, general tax fraud, while Eszter 
Magyar-Áhel would classify it as an organised, cross-border EU VAT fraud. I could also 
mention the EU VAT evasion schemes in question as examples, which – as we will see 
below – are classified differently by different schools.
Objectives and Methodology of Classification
Based on the above, it has to be admitted that in the classification of VAT fraud schemes, 
we cannot avoid establishing a pre-defined, purpose-specific classification criteria sys-
tem. Below, I am attempting to create a classification system of budget fraud schemes regard-
ing VAT along classification principles pointing out the criminal aspects of the investigation 
of each scheme under the statutory provisions.
In creating these categories, I opted for the following classification criteria:
1. working mechanism of VAT
2. invoicing chains between the subject companies
3. elements of statutory definition
Above, I presented some schemes – the list is not exhaustive – more or less matching 
the selected criteria, using the available professional discourse as a source. Below, I am 
attempting to explore the bases for selection of the criteria and the groups of schemes 
I created along these criteria (Table 1).
Fraud schemes based on the working mechanism of VAT
In my opinion, relevance of the working mechanism of VAT as a priority criterion man-
ifests in the fact that the statutory definition of the criminal act also including budget 
fraud by VAT evasion is only a framework disposition, filled with an actual content only 
by the VAT Act, at least with regards to the above criminal act. In connection with this, 
understanding the working mechanism of VAT is essential.
Taking the working mechanism of VAT into account is also paramount when estab-
lishing the financial losses suffered by the budget and caused by VAT evasion, as the 
referred criminal law definition is also based on this (in addition to perpetration in 
a criminal conspiracy and/or for commercial purposes). Though establishment of the 
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value of VAT evasion is a professional issue, however, when appointing a specialised ad-
visor, when laying down the issues to be clarified or when evaluating expert opinions, 
along with the correct establishment of the criminal act of budget fraud, knowing the 
basis of it is still necessary.
Based on the working mechanism of VAT, as we saw it in Figure 1, the budget can 
suffer financial losses in the following ways:
1. Fraudulent increase of deductible VAT (for example, by wilfully accepting ficti-
tious invoices).
2. Omission of return of payable VAT or parts thereof.
The above two fraud schemes are practically the same as the first two scheme groups 
defined by Balázs Gábor Fodor, however, considering the classification criteria laid in 
this writing, I would rather classify the two further schemes defined by him (i.e. mis-
represented tax exemption or hiding domestic purchases) in one of the groups based 
on invoicing chains between companies.
VAT fraud schemes based on invoicing chains between subject companies
Going further into the details of invoicing chains between subject companies will lead 
us closer to the historical facts. Considering that the interest of perpetrators is to create 
chains as sophisticated and complex as possible to conceal their unlawful acts before 
the authorities, it is necessary to understand the main individual chain structures.
Based on the criminal characteristics of their investigation under the Criminal 
Procedure Act, invoicing chains between companies can be categorised as follows:
1. cross-border, organised VAT fraud
2. domestic VAT fraud
Borbála Sólyom, in the classification published in her PhD thesis entitled Combating 
Tax Fraud and Tax Evasion in the European Union, with Special Regards to the Jurispru-
dence of the European Court – in addition to domestic VAT fraud – she also mentioned 
cross-border normal, general tax fraud and missing trader fraud schemes. I did not 
separate the latter two, as missing trader fraud schemes also presume the existence of 
cross-border invoicing chains. Below I will demonstrate that these fraud constructions 
cannot be clearly separated.
In my opinion, in the categorisation of fraud schemes by their criminal character-
istics and by the working mechanism of VAT, the most important criteria is whether 
the invoicing chains are of a  cross-border or domestic nature. From this aspect, 
even the level of organisation of such invoicing chains is secondary, as cross-border 
chains require a higher level of organisation and structure than domestic ones.
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Considering the fraud mechanisms published by Eszter Magyar-Áhel, cross-border, 
organised VAT fraud schemes should be categorised in the following groups:
1. Carousel fraud: The most important characteristic of carousel fraud is that such 
invoicing circles end where they start, and as such, they do not necessarily re-
flect real economic transactions, the system is viable without a market demand 
or actual sales.
2. Missing Trader Intra-Community Fraud (MTIC fraud): These only differ from the 
carousel fraud introduced above that it is induced by an actual market demand, 
and it is aimed at attaining the lowest possible consumer prices and the highest 
profit, from which end consumers also benefit, regardless of whether or not 
they are aware of the fraudulent characteristics of the invoicing chain. Some 
schools also classify MTIC frauds in the same group as carousel fraud, as both 
fraud mechanisms involve missing traders. However, taking into consideration 
that carousel fraud does not require an actual market demand, I would break 
down MTIC fraud schemes further, as follows:
• general MTIC fraud scheme
• VAT refund fraud by fictitious domestic purchase
• VAT refund fraud by concealed domestic sale
3. Fraud schemes other than carousel fraud or MTIC invoicing chains: Fraud schemes 
falling in this category are classified by some schools as MTIC fraud, while 
others see it as separate fraud mechanisms. In my opinion, this latter aspect 
reflects the most the main characteristics of these fraud mechanisms setting 
them apart from the ones detailed previously. Namely, that carousel fraud is 
a  completely fictitious invoicing chain ending where it starts, and aiming to 
cause losses to the budget. In an MTIC fraud, the invoicing chain is not a closed 
loop, and, apart from a  few differences, it is largely equivalent to an arch of 
a carousel fraud, wherein, in addition to fictitious transactions, actual trans-
actions induced by market demand are also present. The primary objective of 
such fraud schemes is decreasing sales prices.
Though the fraud mechanisms detailed below also involve both fictitious economic ac-
tors and actual transactions induced by market demand, the invoicing chain is not the 
same as the one in a typical carousel fraud or an arch thereof. These fraud schemes are 
the following:
• misuse of customs procedure code 42.00
• fictitious intra-Community or export sales
• cross-invoicing fraud
• triangular trade fraud
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Another important fact is that the basis of triangular trade fraud and partly that of the 
cross-invoicing fraud open up further options for the creation of new categories, name-
ly that triangular trade fraud in itself is not a fraud, only if it is linked to a carousel or 
MTIC chain. Also, a cross-invoicing fraud can be absorbed in the same chains, for exam-
ple, when Missing Traders attempt to reduce their tax obligations to zero by such cross- 
invoicing. Therefore, cross invoicing is not necessarily an independent scheme.
When examining domestic VAT evasion cases, we find that perpetrators have less lib-
erty than perpetrators of cross-border VAT evasions. Theoretically, the use of a Missing 
Trader or Buffer company is not ruled out, however, the invoicing chain is way more 
simple and clear. Perpetrators doctor invoices to only one invoice down the invoicing 
chain (input, output or both). Fraudulent acts largely take place by using the schemes 
detailed in connection with the working mechanism of VAT, i.e. acceptance of fictitious 
invoices of expenses or omission of return of payable VAT or parts thereof.
Classification of budget fraud schemes on the elements of statutory 
definition
In my opinion, elements of statutory definition are important criteria of classification 
of fraud schemes, because in investigations, the facts found during the proceeding have 
to be compared with such statutory definition elements before they move on to notifi-
cation of charges. Based on the effective penal code, fraudulent behaviours are classified 
as follows:
1. making a false statement (tax return)
2. concealment of true facts
According to the statutory definition, budget fraud by VAT evasion can be committed 
by both misrepresentation and condoning misrepresentation, however, according to 
the jurisprudence, this is an empty set, therefore, I did not include these schemes in 
my classification.
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Table 1. Classification of schemes of budget fraud by VAT evasion
Working mechanism of VAT Invoicing chains between the subject companies Elements of statutory definition
1. Fraudulent increase of 
deductible VAT
2. Omission of return of 
payable VAT or parts 
thereof
1. Cross-border, organised VAT fraud:
• carousel fraud
MTIC fraud schemes:
• general model of MTIC fraud 
scheme
• VAT refund fraud by fictitious  
domestic purchase
• VAT refund fraud by fictitious 
domestic sales
Fraud schemes other than carousel 
fraud or MTIC invoicing chains:
• misuse of customs procedure code 
42.00
• fictitious intra-Community or 
export sales
• cross-invoicing fraud
• triangular trade fraud
2. Domestic VAT fraud
1. Making a false statement 
(tax return)
2. Concealment of true facts
Source: Compiled by the author.
Summary
In the selection of the categorisation criteria, I have considered the criminal charac-
teristics of the investigation of budget fraud under the Criminal Procedure Act. Along 
these lines, I have selected three criteria: the working mechanism of VAT; the invoicing 
chains between subject companies; and the elements of statutory definition. In my 
opinion, the significance of working mechanism of VAT as a classification criterion lies 
in the fact that the framework statutory definition is only filled by an actual content by 
the VAT Act and that knowing the amount of the budget loss to establish the value of 
and/or evaluate the criminal act is necessary. Going further into the details of invoic-
ing chains between subject companies will lead us closer to the historical facts, and it 
is necessary to know the statutory definition elements to be able to compare the two.
However, other criteria can also be used for the classification of schemes of budget 
fraud by VAT evasion. The methodology created by me differs from the ones published 
in the referred discourses in the choice of several dimensions, i.e. classification criteria, 
as opposed to only one.
Another important fact is that the EU system of value added tax (ratified in Hungary 
by the VAT Act) laying down the working mechanism of VAT, the schemes of the per-
petrators and the statutory definitions of the penal codes change over time. Changing 
of economic environment and taxation conditions result in the change of VAT evasion 
schemes, giving rise to the emergence of increasingly sophisticated mechanisms. After 
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all, I still think that – at the time I am writing this paper – using the categorisation 
system based on the ‘three dimension’ detailed above works well in the classification of 
perpetration schemes emphasising their main criminal characteristics in the investiga-
tion of budget fraud cases by VAT evasion.
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